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or physical welfare of the child required it, but that statute was
repealed by Act 111 of 1956. Proceedings to that effect and
without reference to the tutorship of the child are possible now
only in juvenile court and within the framework of the laws
on neglected children. Perhaps this is not as the law should be,
but it is what the legislation would indicate to be the law.17
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
Seashore
The case of Roy v. Board of Commissioners for Pontchar-
train Levee District' was an action by a landowner for damages
for taking property adjacent to' Lake Pontchartrain used for
levee purposes. Lake Pontchartrain has sometimes been consid-
ered as an arm of the sea, and under the Civil Code classifica-
tion of things, seashore is a "common thing" which is not sus-
ceptible of ownership (neither private nor public) but which all
men may freely use.2 If the area in question is seashore, the
adjacent landowner is not entitled to any damages when the
property is used for levee purposes. In a prior litigation, the
court remanded the case while equivocating about the classifica-
tion of the body of water.8 In the present suit, the levee board's
defense rested largely on the proposed definition of seashore as
"that land normally covered by the highest tides of the year."'4
(Emphasis added.) The court refused to accept this because it
differs from the Civil Code boundary of seashore at "the highest
water during the winter season." (Emphasis added.) However,
"conceding defendant's contention to be sound,"6 the court was
not impressed with the defendant's evidence, and affirmed an
award in favor of the plaintiff.
Does this treatment of the problem mean inferentially that
17. See the author's comments on the effect of the repeal of R.S. 9:551 in 17
LOuISIANA LAw REVIEW 26-27 (1956).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 238 La. 926, 117 So.2d 60 (1960).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 450, 451 (1870).
3. Roy v. Board of Commissioners for Pontchartrain Levee District, 237 La.
541, 111 So.2d 765 (1959) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1958-1959 T'erm -Property, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 216 (1960).
4. 238 La. 926, 932, 117 So.2d 60, 62 (1960).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 451 (1870).
6. 238 La. 926, 932, 117 So.2d 60, 62 (1960).
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Lake Pontchartrain is hereby classified as an arm of the sea?
Since this result is not necessarily implied, the present decision
does not really go any further on this point than the previous
one did.
Levees
Property adjacent to a navigable river (or other navigable
waters) is subject to a legal servitude in favor of the public for
levee purposes.7 It was only in 1898 for Orleans Parish, and in
1921 for all of the state, that any compensation was provided by
the Constitution." With flood control becoming a program of
general concern, the burden on the adjacent proprietor was alle-
viated and thereby distributed throughout the state.9 However,
the constitutional compensation is limited to the assessed value
for the preceding year. In the cases of Weiss v. Board of Com-
missioners for Pontchartrain Levee District ° and Eiseman v.
Board of Commissioners for Pontchartrain Levee District,1
plaintiffs' properties had been taken for levee purposes, but they
claimed full market value rather than accept the assessed value.
The critical question was whether the appropriated land was
property subject to the levee servitude of Civil Code Article 665.
Since the facts established that the strip of land in question did
not border on the water but was 200 feet from the shoreline and
behind a highway which formed a protecting levee, there was no
such servitude and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover fair
market value for the property taken.
Sic Utere Servitude
Article 667 of the Civil Code provides for the legal servitude
that one property may not be used in such a way as to cause
damage to another. There are also principles of tort law which
impose liability on a landowner for damage caused to another -
sometimes based on fault or negligence, sometimes as a strict
liability. This multiplication of devices permits the court to
have a greater range of flexibility in the handling of specific
cases and in directing the development of the law concerning re-
sponsibility where both damage and causality are proven. How-
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 665 (1870).
8. La. Const. art. 312 (1898); LA. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (1921).
9. See discussion in Mayer v. Board of Commissioners for Caddo Levee Dist.,
177 La. 1119, 150 So. 295 (1933) ; Dickson v. Board of Commissioners of Caddo
Levee Dist., 210 La. 121, 26 So.2d 474 (1946).
10. 238 La. 419, 115 So.2d 804 (1959).
11. 238 La. 431, 115 So.2d 808 (1959).
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ever, it is not a very substantial contribution when the court
simply renders a judgment for plaintiff without identifying any
underlying theory for the decision.
In the case of Divicent v. Sanderson,12 the court found that
the pile-driving on one lot had caused damage to a recently con-
structed house on the adjacent lot, and rendered a judgment for
the plaintiff. Since the driving of piles was done in compliance
with local building requirements, and since there was no sug-
gestion of any inefficiency or carelessness in the work, the de-
cision might appear to be based upon the strict responsibility of
Civil Code Article 667, which makes the defendant proprietor
liable regardless of all his care and efficiency simply by reason
of the operation and its harmful effects. However, the court
did not mention this code provision; neither did it cite any of
the previous Louisiana cases involving damage caused by pile-
driving in which liability was predicated upon this Article 667.13
The present case might be cited in the future as an applica-
tion of the sic utere servitude of property law, or (since damage
and causality were established) the tort doctrine of res ipsa
Ioquitur. Does it make any difference?
Tacit Dedication of Public Street
A landowner may construct a street or road on his property
and keep it just as private as his home. However, if he permits
the public (as individuals) to use it, and the public (as local gov-
erning authority) to work or maintain it for three years, it be-
comes a public street or road on the theory of implied dedication
as provided in R.S. 48:491.
In Wyatt v. Hagler,14 a private road (dirt and gravel) had
been in use by the public for seventeen years when the land-
owner closed it with a barricade. During this time, there had
been some maintenance by the municipality, and some objection
by the landowner. In deciding that it had become a public street
by implied dedication, the court made two points that have gen-
eral significance.
The first is with reference to the element of maintenance by
12. 239 La. 51, 117 So.2d 907 (1960).
13. E.g., Hauck v. Brunet, 50 So.2d 495 (La. App. 1951), noted in 6 LOV0LA
L. REV. 77 (1951) ; Bruno v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 67 So.2d 920 (La.
App. 1953).
14. 238 La. 234, 114 So.2d 876 (1959).
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the public. The facts showed that the municipality had "dragged
it and cleaned out the ditch three or four times a year and, on
occasion, placed gravel on it."'15 Since the landowner had also
spread some crushed rock and gravel during four of the seven-
teen years, and once had it graded, the maintenance by the pub-
lic could not be said to have been complete maintenance. How-
ever, the court found it to be "substantial maintenance"' 6 and
that the municipality had "largely maintained"' 7 it. This inter-
pretation as satisfying the requirement of the statute is signifi-
cant.
The second point concerns the somewhat more subjective
element of presumed intent which is the basis of the theory of
implied dedication. The whole idea of dedication is necessarily
a voluntary one because the property in such cases is absolutely
private and there is no question of its being "taken" for any
public purpose. In the present case, the landowner had repeat-
edly asserted his ownership and made objection to the municipal
employees when they worked the road (but apparently without
sufficient vigor to keep them away). It was on this point that
the court of appeal sustained the defendant's position that there
was no intent to dedicate.'8 However, the Supreme Court took
the position that the circumstances of the case, the public use and
maintenance by the municipality required "affirmative and
timely action"19 to prevent the dedication, and that the land-
owner's objections to the workmen without making any protest
to the Mayor or Council of the town "do not bespeak of the action
of a reasonably prudent man in like circumstances. '20 When aperson has for so many years accepted substantial maintenance
by the municipality, it may not appear unfair to deny his right
to barricade the public out of the use of the street, but it doeshave the significant effect of placing upon him the burden ofproving the sufficiency of his protestations against the loss ofhis property. A landowner cannot take the position that since
the public is making some use of his property, it is only fair tolet the public contribute something to its upkeep. In the absence
of totally preventing such a public contribution, do the statutory
elements of public use and (substantial) maintenance for three
years constitute a conclusive presumption of intent to dedicate?
15. Id. at 238-39. 114 So.2d at 877.
16. Ibid.
17. Id. at 239, 114 So.2d at 878.
18. Wyatt v. Hagler, 107 So.2d 568 (La. App. 1958).19. 238 La. 234, 241, 114 So.2d 876, 878-79 (1959).
20. Ibid.
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